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Introduction
The Place of Poetry in  
Contemporary Aesthetics
John Gibson
The title of this volume is The Philosophy of Poetry, and if one is unaware of 
the state of contemporary analytic philosophy of literature, it might seem 
immodest. When I told a colleague from a department of English about 
this project, he commented that the title could only work in a discipline 
as arrogant and cantankerous as Philosophy. I hope few will agree with 
my colleague’s view of our field, but in one respect his opinion was clearly 
misinformed. He appeared to think that the volume looks at the mass of 
existing philosophical work on poetry and pronounces it to be in need of 
a corrective, one which the contributors gathered here heroically produce. 
The mistake is ironic in the proper sense of the term. Those who work in 
the philosophy of literature will know that such boastfulness is not possi-
ble since no such mass of work exists. Indeed, until very recently one could 
fairly say that poetry is the last great unexplored frontier in contemporary 
analytic aesthetics, an ancient and central art we have somehow managed 
to overlook more or less entirely.1 The title of this volume, then, should be 
1 One must here emphasize “analytic” aesthetics because our colleagues in continental 
aesthetics have a better record with poetry. A fuller version of the story of analytic philos-
ophy of literature’s avoidance of poetry would acknowledge that others have tried to bring 
poetry to its attention. I ignore, for example, all that Richard Eldridge has done on behalf 
of re-enfranchising poetry. But he is not properly seen as “analytic”: his work straddles the 
boundary between Anglophone and continental aesthetics and is better seen as trying to 
open up a novel approach to art than as working within one of its established traditions. 
Eldridge edited Beyond Representation: Philosophy and Poetic Imagination (1996), and the 
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read not as braggadocio but as declaring poetry an object of interest for con-
temporary aesthetics.
I said that “until very recently” one could speak of an avoidance of 
poetry in contemporary analytic aesthetics. The watershed moment was 
in 2009, when Ernie Lepore guest-edited an issue of Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy dedicated exclusively to poetry.2 In the same year Ratio pub-
lished a special issue on the philosophy of literature with two articles 
dedicated to poetry.3 Suddenly there was a small foundation of high-
quality work on poetry, and since then a handful of excellent articles on 
poetry has appeared in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, British 
Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophy and Literature, the journals where 
the best work in literary aesthetics tends to end up. What has been espe-
cially exciting to witness is the kind of philosopher who is drawn to 
poetry. It is not surprising that luminaries in the philosophy of litera-
ture such as Peter Lamarque, Kendall Walton, Richard Eldridge, and 
Peter Kivy have recently written on poetry (and that in figures such as 
Anna Christina Ribeiro we see that there are emerging leaders who work 
almost exclusively on poetry).4 What is surprising, and what bodes well 
for the future of the philosophy of poetry, is the number of philosophers 
who primarily work on mind, language, the self, and ethics who have also 
taken an interest in the philosophy of poetry. Ernie Lepore is an obvious 
example, but Elisabeth Camp, Maximilian De Gaynesford, Joseph Stern, 
John Koethe, Patrick Suppes, and Troy Jollimore are also worth noting.5 
In other words, we suddenly find ourselves with work on poetry and an 
exciting list of philosophers who have been producing it. What is needed 
now is a book that organizes and presents contemporary aesthetics’ 
burgeoning interest in poetry in such a way that the shape of a distinct 
and coherent field may appear: a sense of key issues, of standing quar-
rels, of centers of argumentative gravity, of new puzzles and paradoxes, 
volume has played an important role in creating an alternative to (analytic) philosophy of 
literature in which is poetry is central.
2 See Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 33/1 (2009). 3 Ratio, 22/4 (2009).
4 See e.g. Eldridge (2001), Ribeiro (2007), Lamarque (2009), Walton (2011), and Kivy 
(2011). One should add to this list Rowe (2011), John (2013), and McGregor (2014). It is also 
worth noting that much of Robert Stecker’s work on interpretation is unique in that it 
focuses on poetry as well as the novel.
5 All of these authors published on poetry (among elsewhere) in the 2009 issues of 
either Midwest Studies in Philosophy or Ratio. See e.g. Lepore (2009), Camp (2009), de 
Gaynesford (2009), Koethe (2009), Stern (2009), Suppes (2009), and Jollimore (2009).
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of people who must be read and positions that must be dealt with. This is 
the intention behind The Philosophy of Poetry.
The chapters of this volume offer an overview of, and so an introduc-
tion to, the philosophy of poetry, and thus there is little reason for the 
Introduction to do so, too. Instead of surveying developing debates in 
the field, I will try to provide a point of entry to them. I will address my 
points primarily to the reader new to poetry who needs to be alerted to 
some of the basic assumptions and views about the history of poetry 
that inform the chapters here, especially modern poetry, with which the 
majority of contributors concern themselves. My primary audience is the 
philosopher of art who needs to understand why her field should take a 
serious interest in poetry, though my hope is that what I say to her will 
also be helpful to the philosopher in genere who needs to hear why poetry 
should matter to philosophy at large.
I suspect the philosopher of art already agrees with the spirit of this call 
to enfranchise poetry in the philosophy of literature. Poetry, obviously, 
will be a chapter in the story of philosophy of literature. After many years 
in the woods, the philosophy of art has now made its way back near the 
mainstream of philosophy, and the philosophy of literature has done so, 
unsurprisingly, by working on issues adjacent to those in philosophy of 
language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Examples 
are the marquee debates on interpretation, emotion, imagination, fic-
tional reference, truth in fiction, literary cognitivism, and narrative (if 
narrative seems the odd duck here, consider its importance to contempo-
rary debates in the philosophy of the self), and the novel has been the lit-
erary form of choice for these discussions. No shame here, but it is time to 
branch out. Indeed, in recent years philosophers of literature have begun 
to pay serious attention to drama, autobiography, even the graphic novel. 
The philosophy of poetry should be seen as part of this general turn to the 
regions of literary production still awaiting our attention.
Philosophers of art of virtually any stripe should find poetry deserving 
of much more central status in contemporary aesthetics. I will provide a 
few examples of philosophical challenges poetry offers the philosophy of 
art, but it is not just the problems poetry raises that make it so interesting. It 
is that poetry, to a remarkable degree, embodies aspects of the various arts 
and so a discussion of it will naturally draw upon the interests of almost 
any philosopher concerned with art. According to an ancient myth, poetry 
is the mother of the arts: from its rhyme and meter music is born, from its 
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power to conjure up and communicate by way of striking images paint-
ing arises, and from its narratological and imaginative dimensions we get 
stories and the work of fiction. This myth might have things the wrong 
way round—poetry as a distinct, self-aware art form perhaps came about 
largely by cannibalizing older, more basic arts (it will be for the art histo-
rian to tell us)—but nonetheless we see in much poetry a fusing of elements 
of many of the arts, comics and gardening perhaps excluded. Whatever 
one thinks of the myth, it suffices to give one a sense of the extent to which 
poetry can act as a philosophical hub at which the interests of philosophers 
of literature, music, and the visual arts can come together and mingle in 
unexpected and fruitful ways. Other art forms also embody the basic arts 
in one way or another. Just think of dance or opera. But poetry, a linguistic 
creature with intense painterly and musical aspirations, does so in unique 
ways and thus deserves the philosopher of art’s full attention.
It is true that there is a certain kind of philosopher of literature who is 
hostile both to the modern poem and to philosophers who write about 
it. And since the majority of recent work on poetry concerns itself with 
twentieth-century poetry, this sentiment needs to be addressed. If one 
attends enough conferences one will know the sort: the philosopher who 
sees the value of all modern poetry as summed up, say, in the most bla-
tantly nonsensical line of a weak John Ashbery poem. One should not 
mince words here: opinions of this sort reveal a huge, and risible, misun-
derstanding of a philosopher of art’s basic professional responsibilities. 
Whether or not we like poetry of any sort is, strictly speaking, beside 
the point. Our job is not, or not just, to write about the art we adore. As 
philosophers of art, it is to make sense of the art world. And poetry is 
a long-standing and privileged member of that world. Imagine if a phi-
losopher of science tried to justify ignoring physics because he found it 
difficult, odd, or self-important. Happily, however, those who write on 
modern poetry do seem to like it very much, and most people, philoso-
phers included, can be made to love it a little, too.
It is worth belaboring this point. Analytic philosophy of literature has 
produced much work it can be very proud of—research on the nature 
of fiction is arguably the shinning example—but from a certain van-
tage-point our work is bound to seem conservative and far behind the 
work done by our peers in philosophy of music, visual art, even film. 
Our colleagues who labor in these fields write about Bach, Caravaggio, 
and Eisenstein, but they also have something to say about atonal music, 
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action painting, cinematic surrealism, and conceptual art. In other 
words, they have largely done their duty in following their preferred art 
through its various historical manifestations and up to the present. It is 
for this reason that they can get away with claiming that they have pro-
vided philosophical documentation of their chosen art form tout court 
(a gap here and there notwithstanding). Not so for the philosophy of 
literature, which has on the whole ignored not just literary modernism 
but virtually all forms of the avant-garde that have defined the signifi-
cant literary movements of the past one hundred plus years. If litera-
ture had vanished entirely as an artistic practice in the 1880s, it would 
have little visible effect on the kind of work we produce. A Jane Austen 
novel, even a Sherlock Holmes story (from which our field seems to draw 
roughly a third of its examples), could suffice to stage almost all the 
points we make about fiction, interpretation, ontology, and the nature 
of our emotional engagement with literature. It may be true that James 
Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake or Sylvia Plath’s “Daddy” are less than ideal for 
exploring, say, the metaphysics of fictional worlds, and so philosophers 
of literature may be excused for focusing on kinds of literature that are 
better suited for their projects. But the field as a whole pays a great price 
for this: we can claim no comprehensiveness in our treatment of our 
field, and to genuine scholars of literature we can seem dabblers. It is 
on this point that the contributors to this volume are entitled to vaunt: 
this is the first volume in which analytic philosophers of literature take 
the modernist, the avant-garde, and the experimental seriously. It takes 
seriously much else, too. But that is the point: the authors move from 
Milton to Paul Celan, Wordsworth to Wallace Stevens, and much else 
in between. The volume as a whole provides a very good reason to think 
that it will be the philosopher of poetry who will help literary aesthetics 
attain the expansiveness and openness our friends in other areas of ana-
lytic aesthetics have already achieved.
In one sense it is little surprise that many philosophers of art stopped 
reading poetry. Presumably they stopped taking an interest in poetry at 
the same time the vast majority of humans did, namely, at some point in 
the 1910s when modernism reached out across the arts and made them 
“difficult.” Now lest someone draw a silly conclusion, of course there were 
difficult poems before there were difficult modern poems. The issue is 
rather how explicit and productive this difficulty becomes in poetry in the 
wake of, to give a sampling of poets from different traditions, W. B. Yeats, 
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Rainer Maria Rilke,6 Guillaume Apollinaire, and, of course, T. S. Eliot 
and Ezra Pound.7 Modernists such as Pound implored poets to “make it 
new”8 and T. S. Eliot urged that in our age poetry “must be difficult,”9 and 
the vast majority of poets listened while many casual readers of poetry 
apparently moved on. Some believe that modernism ended in the 1950s, 
some believe it has never left us, but since its inception this fabled “dif-
ficulty” has stayed with us in one form or another, regardless of whether 
modernism has as well. For the ocular proof, one need only look at the 
poetry published in recent issues of The Paris Review, The Kenyon Review, 
Tar River Poetry, Poetry, The Wolf, and the many other little or big literary 
magazines that seek out and showcase new poetry. It is an astonishing, 
and heartening, thing that such magazines still flourish.
Now explaining just what modernism is and precisely what this diffi-
culty consists in is not something one is advised to attempt in a thousand 
words or less. But a few words are in order, since this difficulty is so fre-
quently referenced in the following chapters and the reader new to poetry 
will wish to have a sense of what all this amounts to.10 The following way 
of putting it has the virtue of providing the right initial idea, though it is 
incomplete and should be jettisoned once one knows one’s way around 
modern poetry. Here is the idea: in the wake of modernism poetry can no 
longer be read naively. Let me explain.
“Naive” here is not meant in an entirely derogatory sense. To say that an 
artwork of any sort can be appreciated naively is to say that attending only 
to its surface will repay a non-negligible degree of aesthetic interest. To 
6 In the case of both Rilke and Yeats, it would be their later works that have a claim 
to being modernist, and their poetic careers reflect in miniature the passage from 
nineteenth-century romanticism to twentieth-century modernism.
7 However we define poetic modernism—this is no easy task—most scholars acknowl-
edge it is underfoot well before the early 1900s. The birth of poetic modernism is often 
attributed to the French symbolist poets, and the crucial event is usually thought to be the 
publication in 1857 of Charles Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal.
8 This is the title of Pound (1934). 9 Eliot (1975, 65).
10 The reader who wants more than I offer here might consult some of the following 
studies. For a general overview of the lyric, see Susan Stewart (2009). For studies of mod-
ern, largely British and American, poetry, see Pinsky (1976), Altieri (1984), Golding (1995), 
and Izenberg (2011). Leighton (2007) offers an excellent discussion of how to navigate 
the aesthetic and philosophical concerns of prominent lines of modern poetry. To read 
Vendler (2005) and Bernstein (2011) is to see two very different ways of approaching the 
modern poem that are emblematic of two very different contemporary critical sensibili-
ties and practices. For a popular work on the difficult modern poem, see Orr (2011).
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appreciate a literary work of art naively is to find that one can take pleas-
ure in it without concerning oneself with, for example, questions of the 
artistic project that underwrites a work, the significance of its form, the 
more clandestine forms of meaning and aboutness it bears, and so on. 
The great realist novel is a master of providing such surfaces, surfaces 
that often open up on to an interior of immense complexity. The reader 
who searches out this complexity will of course attend to the surface, too. 
But the naive reader may remain there, reading, say, Henry James’s The 
American as just a well-told tale of an expatriate in Paris who unfortu-
nately falls in love with a member of the aristocracy, ignoring along the 
way all of James’s grander pursuits in the novel. There is nothing wrong 
with an artwork that bears a surface that can be appreciated naively. 
Indeed, bearing such a surface is a tried and true way of forging that cru-
cial initial bond between audience and work. The great romantic poets 
of the nineteenth century mastered this in their own way, though at this 
point much pressure was already beginning to be placed on the reader who 
approaches poetry too naively. Nevertheless, to read, say, Wordsworth’s 
“The World is Too much With Us” naively would be to read it is as a series 
of mellifluous lines about sleeping flowers and pleasant leas which cumu-
latively and fairly straightforwardly yield a point to the effect that modern 
life alienates us from nature. In calling this “naive” there is no implication 
that the content of my naive reading is wholly unfaithful to the poem or 
misleads us as to what Wordsworth was really trying to say through it. 
The surface offers a preliminary encounter with, as it were, meaning and 
beauty; and what happens in the classroom or in a good work of criticism 
is that this initial encounter is treated as the first rung of a ladder we are 
expected to climb if we are to achieve a view of the poem’s complexity and 
so of its full aesthetic and cultural significance. No insult to the surface of 
the poem is implied, just that the serious reader shall wish to move beyond 
it at a certain point and that in doing so she will entitle herself to claim 
that she has fully experienced the poem as a poem and not just as a pretty 
expression of a deep-sounding idea.
Whatever else poetic modernism is, it abandons to a great extent just 
about everything that makes naive reading possible, and herein lies much 
of its fabled difficulty. The terms that abound in this volume are compres-
sion, density, abstraction, and opacity, and all are sophisticated ways of 
marking the basic idea that in the wake of modernism much poetry turns 
against the standard practice of offering even the semblance of accessible 
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surfaces. We often find a play of images couched in language that revels 
in its assault on our linguistic and communicative expectations, and fre-
quently we are not even offered an apparent preliminary encounter with 
meaning. Now when speaking of “meaning” in the context of poetry, 
one likely should not have in mind what a philosophers such as Frege or 
Davidson mean by “meaning.” When speaking of poetry the concept of 
meaning is used broadly to indicate whatever it is that endows a poem 
with aboutness, with communicative content, with a point: with the 
capacity, perhaps despite everything, to speak to the reader. And one way 
of putting what all the talk of density, compression, opacity, and the like 
gesture towards is the remarkable extent to which we experience mean-
ing as latent in so much poetry of the last one hundred years. It tends 
to hold out meaning as a promise, as a destination rather than a point 
of departure,11 and this distinguishes it hugely from most other uses of 
language, where the goal is usually to wear meaning on the sleeve. To 
achieve even minimal understanding of much modernist poetry, we very 
frequently must treat a poem not merely as an object of aesthetic inter-
est but, before this is even possible, as an object of scrutiny, which is one 
thing naive reading will not tolerate. Finally, we find explicit hostility to 
what may be described as the “narrativising tendencies” of naive read-
ing.12 It is true that lyric poetry, the dominant form of modern poetry, 
has always had a hesitant relationship with narrative. But one of the basic 
habits of naive reading is to approach a poem as always implying a narra-
tive, and so as calling on the reader to unearth the story it suggests, and 
this has a very nasty habit of occluding the more radical, and artistically 
significant, manners in which poetry can engage with thought, feeling, 
and life. A lyric can dazzle us simply by exercising its expressive or formal 
powers, and it need not be expressing a story or have the form of a nar-
rative if it is to so dazzle. These narrativizing tendencies might always 
be a nuisance when approaching lyric poetry, but the modern lyric often 
seems to be engaged in a holy war against them, and thus it refuses to let 
the naive reader employ one of his most basic strategies for approaching 
literary content of any form.13
11 We may never reach the promised destination, but that is another story.
12 My notion of narrativizing tendencies is heavily indebted to Peter Goldie’s discus-
sion of “fictionalizing tendencies” in Goldie (2012, 150–2).
13 One important difference between the ways an analytic and continental philoso-
pher of literature are inclined to talk about modernist art can be seen here. I’ve made the 
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Compare a poem that makes concessions to the naive reader to one 
that clearly does not.
Emily Dickinson, “Hope is the thing with feathers” (1865, approx.):
“Hope” is the thing with feathers
That perches in the soul
And sings the tune without the words
And never stops—at all
And sweetest—in the Gale—is heard
And sore must be the storm
That could abash the little Bird
That kept so many warm
I’ve heard it in the chillest land
And on the strangest Sea
Yet—never—in Extremity,
It asked a crumb—of me.14
Wallace Stevens, first stanza of “Sunday Morning” (1915):
Complacencies of the peignoir, and late
Coffee and oranges in a sunny chair,
And the green freedom of a cockatoo
Upon a rug mingle to dissipate
The holy hush of ancient sacrifice.
She dreams a little, and she feels the dark
Encroachment of that old catastrophe,
As a calm darkens among water-lights.
The pungent oranges and bright, green wings
Seem things in some procession of the dead,
Winding across wide water, without sound.
The day is like wide water, without sound,
Stilled for the passing of her dreaming feet
Over the seas, to silent Palestine,
Dominion of the blood and sepulchre.15
story fundamentally one of meaning whereas for the continental philosophy it would be 
essentially made a matter of politics. One should suspect that a satisfying account would 
address both aspects, since they are clearly intertwined (one cannot e.g. explain the dif-
ficulty of Celan’s language without also, at some point, speaking of the Shoah).
14 Dickinson (1999, 140). The poem was published posthumously and is assumed to 
have been written in the mid-1860s.
15 Stevens (2005, 66–7).
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I take it there is no question who the modernist is and which poem is 
more accessible to naive reading. Both Dickinson and Stevens are, 
in their own ways, exceptional poets, and one would be very unjust to 
Dickinson to treat hers as an example of guileless romanticism, just in 
case the reader thinks a value judgment is implied here. But we do see a 
marked difference, and Stevens is emblematic of a basic form of difficulty 
one finds in the modernist poem. The nature of the difficulty will change 
greatly as one moves between, say, Gertrude Stein, Louis Zukofsky, and 
W. H. Auden. But what I have said should suffice to provide the reader 
new to poetry with a general sense of what one has in mind when talking 
about this difficulty.
However radical modernism can at first appear, many (though not all) 
critics will urge something like a continuity thesis according to which 
modernism, while surely offering many formal innovations, is on the 
whole better seen not as breaking entirely with poetry’s past so much as 
finding new, properly poetic grounds for inheriting it. Whether or not 
the continuity thesis holds will likely depend on the poet one is consid-
ering. But some version of the continuity thesis surely applies to many 
modernists, Eliot, Stevens, and even Ashbery included. Think of it in 
the following terms: in stripping away all that is essential to naive read-
ing, the modernist poet brings us closer to what poetry has really always 
been.16 The loss of a surface that can be read naively thus turns out to be 
no loss to poetry of any genuine sort at all.17 Consider the old idea that 
absolute music can train one how to appreciate the aesthetically relevant 
features of music, which the presence of lyric can pollute. In a similar 
spirit, one might claim that the difficult modern poem gives us that, and 
only that, which has ever mattered to poetry and thus that through the 
modern poem we learn something important about how to read poetry 
in general.
All of this allows me to say very succinctly how poetry presents liter-
ary aesthetics with important new philosophical challenges. The point 
16 I ignore what the question of in what, precisely, this core of poeticity common to 
poems before and after modernism will consist in. This is, expectedly, the point on which 
the continuity thesis is pressed.
17 The introduction to Izenberg (2011), “Person, Poetry, and Personhood,” offers an 
excellent overview of competing avant-garde and traditionalist interpretations of poetic 
modernism.
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should be obvious. It turns out that at least one of things the modern 
poem strips away is the very thing with which contemporary philosophy 
of literature is essentially concerned. And if a version of the continuity 
thesis holds, this means that many of our popular theories in the phi-
losophy of literature are at best only awkwardly suited for making sense 
of poetry of almost any sort. What I hope this discussion of the modern 
poem motivates is a sense of that we have an entire region of literary art 
that will call on us to revise and rethink much of what we say when we 
speak about literature. To have a sense of this, one first must acknowl-
edge how essential the notion of a fictional narrative is to so much of our 
research and indeed to our basic sense of the philosophical problems lit-
erature raises. Then one need only ask what happens to our sense of these 
problems once the notion of a fictional narrative is rendered inapplica-
ble or made of at best secondary importance? One might argue that all 
poetry is fictional, though there are powerful reasons to be skeptical of 
this. But no sound argument looms that they are all fictional narratives. 
So what happens, for example, to our theories of imagination, tailored as 
they are to illuminate the forms of make-believe and pretence that allow 
us to immerse ourselves in a fictional story? What happens to our theo-
ries of the nature of our emotional responses to literature, occasioned as 
they largely are by the problem of explaining how we can emote over fic-
tional events unfolding in essentially narrative time? More broadly, what 
happens to our theories of the meaning and interpretation of literary 
language when we look at an art that seems content to communicate fig-
uratively, imagistically, symbolically, perhaps even prosodically or for-
mally, that is, to communicate poetically?18 My claim is not that poetry 
will force us to abandon all of our previous work; but since this work is 
so linked to an interest in fictional narratives and guided by a broadly 
novelistic conception of literature, our theories will have to be expanded, 
modified, and made to respect the unique ways in which poetry engages 
imagination, emotion, and meaning.
There is much more one could say here, and one should expect the 
list of problems poetry raises for philosophy to extend well beyond the 
handful of examples just given. But it is best to let the chapters of this 
volume offer specific details about the ways in which poetry presents 
18 I explore this in Gibson (2011).
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unique problems for the philosophy of literature and beyond. While 
I hope to have said enough to spark the reader’s interest, it is the con-
tributors to this volume who provide the richest examples of why poetry 
matters to philosophy.
The volume opens with Peter Lamarque’s probing and wide-ranging 
“Semantic Finegrainedness and Poetic Value.” Though the business of 
the chapter is to articulate and defend a novel thesis, along the way it 
offers a fine overview of many basic issues in the philosophy of poetry, 
particularly those concerning meaning. Lamarque explores a general 
puzzle about lyric poetry, especially, though not exclusively, the modern 
short lyric. The often extraordinary linguistic compression of much lyric 
poetry make these poems, to say the least, resistant to understanding. 
Why do we value art that pushes language to such extremes? Lamarque’s 
response to this builds on the idea that in poetry we are concerned not 
just with content but with a “subject-realised-in-just-this-way,” and this 
reveals the extent to which expression is the chief object of poetic appre-
ciation and critical scrutiny. Understanding this aright sheds light on 
long-standing debates concerning the so-called heresy of paraphrase, the 
supposed identity of poetic form and content, and the idea that poetry 
bears a uniquely poetic brand of meaning.
Ronald de Sousa’s “The Dense and the Transparent:  Reconciling 
Opposites” uses a discussion of linguistic density to revisit the ancient 
feud between poetry and philosophy. The poet embraces suggestion, 
symbolism, polysemy, and metaphor, and this places the poet’s preferred 
use of language at a pole almost exactly opposite the philosopher’s, which 
privileges clarity of expression, modestly in delivery, and writing that has 
an apparent subject or point. But there are powerful reasons for thinking 
that the difference between the creative labor of poet and philosopher 
is not nearly as pronounced as we might think. Each, de Sousa shows, is 
concerned with truth, each aims at providing fresh vision, and each has 
an essential but surprisingly hesitant relationship to language.
Jesse Prinz and Eric Mandelbaum’s “Poetic Opacity: How to Paint 
Things with Words” offers a new framework for approaching the notions 
of linguistic density and compression so central to discussions of the 
nature of poetic language. For Prinz and Mandlebaum, semantic den-
sity and like features of poetic language turn out to be forms of poetic 
opacity. Indeed, the particular forms of opacity that poetry is apt to pro-
duce are the “the mark of the poetic,” its distinguishing feature and that 
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upon which a definition, such as poetry will admit of, can be constructed. 
The chapter identifies various forms of poetic opacity and explains their 
interrelation and aesthetic significance. Prinz and Mandelbaum con-
clude by drawing a striking analogy between our experience of poetic 
opacity and Richard Wollheim’s notion of the “twofoldness” of represen-
tational painting.
With Sherri Irvin’s “Unreadable Poems and How They Mean” we turn 
to a demonstration of how a poem whose language is evidently sense-
less can nonetheless bear rich forms of meaning and aboutness. In this 
way it shows that even poems that rejoice in their attack on sense and 
syntax cannot so easily be dismissed as nonsense and so impervious to 
understanding. Interpretation is the primary tool for overcoming the 
often powerfully felt gap between a reader’s understanding and a poem’s 
meaning, and Irvin documents the various techniques we enlist to get 
a poem that appears meaningless to begin to speak. The meanings we 
ascribe to poems are not mere subjective projections; they turn out to 
be, in standard cases, open to intersubjective appraisal and so are pub-
licly available. If this is so, popular ideas that much contemporary avant-
garde poetry is meaningless or so “private” as to be inscrutable are bunk.
Simon Blackburn’s “Can an Analytic Philosopher Read Poetry?” offers 
a tongue-in-cheek indictment of analytic philosophy for providing us 
with philosophical resources too impoverished to be capable of making 
sense of the poetic use of language and its significance in human life. The 
contemporary philosopher’s Fregean inheritance, concerned as it is with 
truth and reference—poems can appear to have neither—make it very dif-
ficult to acknowledge the philosophical, moral, and cultural value of the 
poet’s labor. Blackburn shows that the matter is not as bleak as it seems, 
but there are concerns dear to many philosophers that reveal them to have 
a radically different set of expectations about language than the poet does 
(he offers the current debate on semantic vagueness as one example of 
this). In respect to the ancient feud, Blackburn ultimately concludes that it 
is the poet’s sensitivity to language that has the greater claim to being “our 
best guide to who we are, and even to where we ought to be heading.”
In “The Spoken and the Written: An Ontology of Poems,” Anna 
Christina Soy Ribeiro situates the discussion of poetry firmly in con-
temporary metaphysics, and her chapter offers an excellent sense of the 
extent to which poetry can raise pressing and unique problems for the 
ontology of literary works. Unlike, say, the modern novel, poetry is both 
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a written and a spoken art, and Ribeiro sets herself the task of offering an 
ontology of poetic works that respects the diversity of poetic practices 
old and new. Poems, Ribeiro argues, are abstract artifacts whose exist-
ence is essentially dependent on culturally and historically situated prac-
tices. These practices are, in the broadest sense, either inscription-based 
or declamation-based, and this helps us to acknowledge the role of both 
textuality and orality in diverse poetic traditions. The upshot of Ribeiro’s 
theory is that philosophers are hugely mistaken to think that one can 
offer a generic ontology of literary works. The various literary arts each 
require their own metaphysical attention.
In Roger Scruton’s “Poetry and Truth” we turn to a discussion of the 
notion of poetic truth. Is the form of truth poetry is apt to explore a kind 
of propositional or discursive truth? Is it a matter of a poem providing 
a “true representation” of reality? Scruton sees poetry’s particular way 
with truth as more fundamental that any of these traditional conceptions 
of truth can allow. Poetry does not earn its claim to truth by mirroring 
an external world or by stating discrete, correct, “facts” about it. Scruton 
argues that poetry is concerned with truth as a kind of revelation, an 
“unconcealing” of aspects of existence that lie hidden from us in our eve-
ryday encounters with the world. Poetry, for Scruton, transforms those 
aspects of reality it so presents, bestowing value upon them and infusing 
them with new forms of meaning. In this respect, in poetry we find a 
genuinely creative interest in truth.
In “Poetry’s Knowing:  So What Do We Know?” Angela Leighton 
offers an account of knowledge suitable for the poet, whose interest in 
knowledge is often very different from the philosopher’s. The grammar 
of the phrase “poetic knowing” is important, since the continuous pre-
sent emphasizes that the poet tends to treat knowledge as a “tentative, 
unfinished journey, a foray into poetry’s difficult thickets of meaning.” 
Leighton’s essay reveals the different kinds of cognitive interest we can 
take in the affairs of life, and she compares philosophical and poetic 
works to highlight how the forms of writing and thinking distinctive of 
each open up or preclude ways of knowing. This chapter does not take 
a side in the ancient quarrel, but it does offer powerful reasons against 
thinking that the descendants of Socrates have a greater claim to the pur-
suit of knowledge than those of Sappho.
Alison Denham’s “Ethical Estrangement:  Pictures, Poetry, and 
Epistemic Value” explores the cognitive and moral significance of the kind 
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of imaginative experience poetry offers. She identifies two forms of imagi-
native experience that are especially important to poetry: “experiencing-as” 
and “experience-taking.” Experiencing-as is “inherently first-personal, 
embodied, and phenomenologically characterized,” while in experience- 
taking one “takes the perspective of another, simulating some aspect or 
aspects of his psychology as if they were his own.” Through a sensitive and 
probing reading of Paul Celan’s Psalm, Denham shows the role these two 
forms of experience play in producing the unique form of ethical and epis-
temic value poetry can bear. Denham’s argument for this has important 
implications for our understanding of the poetic imagination and nature of 
our experience of meaning in poetic contexts.
With the concluding two chapters we see the importance of close read-
ing. In “The Inner Paradise” Tzachi Zamir turns attention away from the 
lyric and to the epic poem, using Paradise Lost to structure a discussion 
of the philosophical and epistemic value of poetry. Zamir calls into ques-
tion the habit of explaining the relationship between philosophy and lit-
erature in terms of a “compensatory” thesis according to which literature 
is able to bring to perfection and so complete the forms of understand-
ing philosophy pursues. Zamir argues that literature is often hostile to 
the compensatory thesis, and he offers a close reading of Paradise Lost 
to demonstrate that poetry’s pursuit of insight, even knowledge, often 
takes a distinctly aesthetic and literary, rather than philosophical, form. 
It is not a completion of the philosopher’s project but a distinctly poetic 
manner of pursuing and articulating knowledge. In this respect, there is 
a unique form of poetic knowledge, and we should not expect philosophy 
to take us very far in coming to possess it.
The volume concludes with Richard Eldridge’s “ ‘To Think Exactly and 
Courageously’: Poetry, Ingeborg Bachmann’s Poetics, and her Bohemia 
Poem.” His reading of Ingeborg Bachman’s “Böhmen liegt am Meer” 
explores the extent to which the poem is exemplary of the distinctive 
achievements of lyric poetry. The poem provides an object study in how 
the lyric allows the human voice to pursue, and at times acquire, expres-
sive freedom. The various sonic, affective, rhythmic, figurative, and 
expressive devices of poetry account for why its products are not merely 
lovely aesthetic objects but exemplary of the “imaginative economy of 
human life.” What lyric that aspires to this status shows us is the unique 
claim poetry has to providing what Stendhal called the promesse de 
bonheur.
16 John Gibson
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